Next time I consider writing a race-based post I am just going to look for Supreme Court opinions on point.
From today’s Conlaw reading:
Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 241 (U.S. 1995)
(STEVENS, J., dissenting). It is also true that “remedial” racial preferences may reflect “a desire to foster equality in society,” But there can be no doubt that racial paternalism and its unintended consequences can be as poisonous and pernicious as any other form of discrimination.
So-called “benign” discrimination teaches many that because of chronic and apparently immutable handicaps, minorities cannot compete with them without their patronizing indulgence.
Inevitably, such programs engender attitudes of superiority or, alternatively, provoke resentment among those who believe that they have been wronged by the government’s use of race. These programs stamp minorities with a badge of inferiority and may cause them to develop dependencies or to adopt an attitude that they are “entitled” to preferences.
And,
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 349 (U.S. 2003)
(SCALIA) Still other suits may challenge the bona fides of the institution’s expressed commitment to the educational benefits of diversity that immunize the discriminatory scheme in Grutter. (Tempting targets, one would suppose, will be those universities that talk the talk of multiculturalism and racial diversity in the courts but walk the walk of tribalism and racial segregation on their campuses–through minority-only student organizations, separate minority housing opportunities, separate minority student centers, even separate minority-only graduation ceremonies.)
The university described in Scalia’s parenthetical reminds me a lot of the University of Miami, where there was a beast known as “minority life” which consisted of minority fraternal organizations, clubs, events, and a de facto minority dorm.
That was also why I didn’t apply to the minority Big Law summer internship program, which had a prompt akin to “Tell us your victimization story.”
Anyhoot. Back to Conlaw… this week is officially crunch time…
5 Comments
Laurie
October 22, 2009 at 12:01 pmThis is a very shallow summary, but I think that many problems might be ameliorated (not solved) by going in a different direction. We ended up arguing about Grutter quite a bit in Con Law Deux. In my opinion, the court had a chance in San Antonio Ind. School District (and the Seattle case), instead of using minority status, to allow poverty to be a suspect class. Because in that case, it was allowing the state to set these odd ways of divvying up educational funds where the wealthiest neighborhoods receive the most funds, merely because that neighborhood is wealthy. If the SC had stepped in and said poverty is a suspect class, hence facial discrimination, then things like educational funds would be distributed evenly.
Of course, there are numerous problems with that (poverty is not limited to any of the factors associated with a suspect class from the original analyses, what is poverty).
Sorry, I have had wayyy too much caffeine today and am a little hyper.
Jansen
October 22, 2009 at 5:43 pmWe haven’t gotten to that case yet!
Laurie
October 22, 2009 at 12:29 pmI meant my comment is a shallow summary. Damn words.
Anon
October 23, 2009 at 2:02 amYour first quote, from the Pena case, is from Justice Thomas’ concurrence, not Justice Stevens’ dissent.
Jansen
October 23, 2009 at 9:51 amWoops. That’s copycite from Lexis for you.