As if you don’t have enough cases to read… here is one I truly enjoyed…
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
WILSON
v.
STATE.
Nov. 15, 1893.
Appeal from district court, Gonzales county; T. H. Spooner, Judge.
Reeves Wilson was convicted of manslaughter, and appeals. Reversed.
HURT, P. J.
There was a dance at the house on S. Winkfield’s farm in Gonzales county on the night of the 26th of November, 1892. The deceased, Bagley, was the “fiddler;” and while “playing the fiddle,” there being quite a number of ladies present, Steve Wilson (brother of appellant) came into the room, and began cursing and using vulgar language.
Bagley requested him to stop using such language in presence of the ladies, whereupon Steve said, “If you think you can make me stop, you had better try it.” Bagley got up, fiddle in hand, and placed one hand on Steve, and said, “You ought not to do that way.”
They then struck one or two blows, when defendant and his brother Sam came up, defendant striking Bagley on the head with a large rock, and some one stabbing him with a knife, inflicting a mortal wound. Some of the witnesses saw the knife before Sam struck deceased, and some did not. No witness swears that appellant saw the knife.
There is no proof beyond the mere fact that they acted together as above that Sam and appellant had conspired to make the assault and battery upon deceased. Now, if they had conspired–agreed together to commit the battery,–appellant to use the rock and Sam the knife,–Bagley being killed by either one, the homicide being culpable, both would be guilty to the same extent, without reference to who inflicted the mortal wound.
On the other hand, if the act of appellant was not in prosecution of an assault,–conspiracy between Sam and himself,–but was independent of it, he acting upon his own motion, Sam, having inflicted the mortal wound, would be responsible for the homicide.
Again, if two or more persons conceive the intention at the same time to strike B. without previous concert, and do strike him without knowing the intention of the other, each would be responsible for his own acts, but would not be an aider or abettor of the other. To apply this rule to this case, if appellant, without concert with Sam, and without knowledge of his intentions, conceived the intention to and did strike Bagley with a rock about the time that Sam stabbed him, he would not be responsible for said act; nor would he, in striking Bagley, be aiding or abetting Sam in his acts.
But, notwithstanding this, if appellant assaulted deceased with the rock he would be responsible for the homicide; or, if the blow with the rock contributed materially to the death of Bagley, he also would be responsible. This being so, appellant had the right to prove the extent of the wound caused by the rock.
He had the right to go into this subject fully. And if he could have shown that the wound inflicted by him did not materially contribute to the death of deceased, and that there was no concert between Sam and himself, nor that he had knowledge of Sam’s intentions, then he would not have been responsible for the homicide.
The court erred in rejecting the proposed evidence regarding the extent of the wound made by the rock, and, in line with this theory of the case, the special instructions requested by counsel for appellant. Though but slightly correct, they very pertinently called the attention of the court to the proper charge which should have been prepared and given to the jury. Judgment reversed, and cause remanded.
Tex.Crim.App. 1893.
WILSON v. STATE.
24 S.W. 409
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